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ABSTRACT 
The DoD currently employs red teams to conduct network 
infiltration and security training for network 
administrators and operators.  Red Teams provide the most 
realistic and thorough training to defend against real-
world threats and we are developing a system to mimic this 
highly trained adversary based on the proof of concept 
framework developed by CDR Will Taff and LCDR Paul 
Salevski. 
This thesis is meant to perform a verification and 
validation analysis of the suitability of the MALWARE Mimic 
concept as a methodology for conducting network 
administrator network security training and awareness, 
alleviation of red team availability constraints, and 
network user security awareness training. We also develop a 
strategy by which the effectiveness of the MALWARE Mimic 
system for increasing such network security awareness and 
elevating the information assurance posture of distributed 
command networks can be measured. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to be 
increasingly reliant on information technology and the 
associated networked infrastructure to complete its various 
missions.  The automation of some critical tasks has helped 
enabled the DoD to meet the challenge of protecting the 
United States of America; however, the cyber domain is a 
rapidly evolving environment with its own inherent threats 
and security challenges.  Malicious software in the form of 
Internet worms, viruses, and botnets, as well as other 
threats, pose a great security risk to the DoD and ipso 
facto the security of the nation.  To counteract the 
continuously evolving cyber security threats, the DoD 
conducts training for network administrators and operators 
to raise their awareness of malicious software behaviors 
and to increase the Information Assurance readiness of DoD 
networks. 
A. NETWORK ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING 
To ensure that DoD network administrators are properly 
equipped with the skills necessary to defend their 
networks, the DoD conducts training through various 
methods. Classroom training is often utilized to 
familiarize network administrators with current security 
threats and how to handle them. Classroom network 
laboratories are also utilized to conduct “hands-on” 
training with malicious software and network 
vulnerabilities. However, the most realistic network 
security training is conducted with the use of red teams 
[1], [2].  Red teams are groups of highly skilled personnel 
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that act as adversaries to test network administrators on 
the recognition of malware and current vulnerabilities that 
our networks are facing. 
B. DEFICIENCIES IN OUR CURRENT APPROACH TO TRAINING 
While red teams provide the most effective training 
currently, there are some inherent constraints associated 
with the use of red teams for training network 
administrators. With the ever increasing reliance on 
information systems to conduct all facets of missions in 
the DoD, the demand for training of network administrators 
using red teams has skyrocketed. Red teams are a 
constraining resource due to the advanced skill sets they 
possess, limited budgets, and increased operational tempo 
due to the increased demand; and for these reasons, the red 
teams simply cannot keep up with the demand to conduct 
training across the DoD. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
With the establishment of the United States Tenth 
Fleet/ Fleet Cyber Command for cyber warfare, and the cyber 
domain evolving as a warfare area, we need to develop a 
strategy for augmenting the current training structure 
which is dependent on the resource-constrained red teams.  
Towards this end, we seek to leverage the framework 
previously developed by CDR Will Taff and LCDR Paul 
Salevski and further their research of a software based 
“Malware Mimic” training tool to increase the 
standardization and availability of network cyber defense 
training [1]. 
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In this thesis, we perform verification and validation 
analysis of the suitability of the Malware Mimic-based 
approach implemented in Malicious Activity Simulation Tool 
(MAST), for conducting network administrator network 
security training and awareness, alleviation of red team 
availability constraints, and network user security 
awareness training. Further, we develop a strategy for 
assessing the effectiveness of MAST for increasing such 
network security awareness and elevating the information 
assurance posture of distributed command. Based on 
application of this strategy, MAST provides an extensible, 
robust capability to assess network administrator and user 
security awareness and compliance. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provides a brief description of the problem 
statement as well as motivation for the research, i.e., the 
increased security of the DoD’s computer network assets and 
ipso facto, the security of the nation as a whole. 
Chapter II outlines previous research conducted in 
this area and describes the implications of that research.  
Chapter II also provides a more formal definition of red 
teams and provides some examples of how red teams are 
utilized to conduct training in the DoD.  Additionally, 
Chapter II discusses some of the threats and 
vulnerabilities that DoD network administrators currently 
face.  It also discusses how we currently conduct network 
security testing and training with red teams and also 
further delineates some of the shortcomings of our current 
approach to training network administrators with red teams. 
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Finally, Chapter II presents an example training scenario 
with MAST to lay the foundation for verifying and 
validating the tool. 
Chapter III discusses the design considerations and 
test platform implemented to further develop the MAST 
system and that must be validated as a training tool.  
Chapter III also provides an overview of the MAST system 
and how we intend it to be used as a training tool.  
Additionally, Chapter III describes the hardware and 
software that we utilized to implement the MAST system.  
Finally, we discuss the Host Based Security System (HBSS) 
that is currently deployed on DoD networks to provide 
security to Windows and Unix based servers and 
workstations. 
Chapter IV provides a critical analysis of red teams 
and ethical hackers versus the MAST system by analyzing 
some common methods employed by red teams and discussing 
how the MAST system will accomplish similar tasks while 
reducing the risk associated with the training.  
Additionally, Chapter IV discusses some metrics for 
comparison of the MAST system with red teams and other 
network administrator training tools.  Finally, Chapter IV 
discusses some methods for measuring the effectiveness of 
the MAST system in mimicking training conducted by red 
teams. 
Chapter V provides conclusions as a result of this 
study.  Additionally, Chapter V outlines future work to be 
conducted on this project before it is ready for final 
testing and production. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides insight into what red teams are 
and how they are employed in the DoD to provide training to 
network administrators.  Additionally, this chapter offers 
insight into typical approaches and threats that red teams 
utilize to infiltrate DoD networks.  Finally, this chapter 
explores how we currently train and discusses some issues 
associated with our reliance on red teams. 
A. RED TEAMS 
A red team “seeks to behave in a manner consistent 
with the world view and cultural beliefs of a potential 
adversary” [2]. Red teams are typically comprised of 
specially selected individuals who are trained to 
anticipate and simulate the behaviors of potential 
adversaries in order to achieve the most realistic 
training.  According to Committee on National Security 
Systems (CNSS) Instruction Number 4009 (National 
Information Assurance Glossary), a red team is defined as:  
A group of people authorized and organized to 
emulate a potential adversary’s attack or 
exploitation capabilities against an enterprise’s 
security posture. The Red Team’s objective is to 
improve enterprise Information Assurance by 
demonstrating the impacts of successful attacks 
and by demonstrating what works for the defenders 
(i.e., the Blue Team) in an operational 
environment. [3] 
 The purpose of red teams is to “challenge the 
effectiveness of new operational concepts in future crisis 
and conflicts” [2]. An added enhancement to the training 
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provided is the fact that red teams are not scripted 
opponents and that they are actually dynamic adversaries 
that adapt to the trainee’s actions and the scenario.  The 
use of red teams in training forces an organization to look 
critically at its policies and procedures to ensure that it 
is up to the task of facing a live, thinking adversary.   
The concept of a red team is not new; for years, our 
military has tested operational units’ Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures (TTPs) against Opposing Forces (OPFOR) with 
the intent of simulating a dynamic adversary. OPFOR and red 
teams are utilized at all levels of military planning and 
training.  The armed forces currently utilize OPFOR at the 
tactical level, such as infantry and mechanized units at 
the Army’s National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA, as 
well as aviation units at the Navy’s Aggressor Squadron at 
Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada, to train units against a 
live, dynamic adversary. The red teams, which are typically 
led by staff Intelligence Officers, have studied our 
potential adversaries and use this knowledge to create 
realistic combat training scenarios against a credible, 
dynamic opponent [2]. 
The global war game held annually at the Naval War 
College in Newport, Rhode Island, is an example of red 
teams being utilized at the strategic level in order to 
hone our TTPs against a real, thinking opponent.  The use 
of red teams and the global war game have had a significant 
impact on national and military guidance publications, such 
as the National Security Strategy, Joint Strategy Review, 
and the Maritime Strategy. One of the most notable 
instances of this influence is that the global war game 
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from 1984 to 1988 completely reshaped our way of naval 
thinking, which led to the development of the Maritime 
Strategy [4]. By utilizing red team think tanks and war 
gaming scenarios, the possible actions of forecasted 
adversaries can be identified.  This information might then 
influence the policy and actions of the entire DoD. 
With regard to cyber security, red teams are a vital 
component of training for government and military 
information systems operators.  The term operator can be 
very broad and might include the entire staff, such as 
managers and officers, administrators, engineers, help 
desk, and technicians.  For this thesis, the scope of the 
term operator will be limited to administrators, help desk 
personnel, and technicians. 
One example of red teams being used during a cyber-
security training exercise is the annual Cyber Defense 
Exercise (CDX) in which the United States Service 
Academies, as well as other military academic institutions 
(Air Force Institute of Technology, Naval Postgraduate 
School), square-off against the National Security Agency 
red team.  In the weeks leading up to CDX, the competing 
schools build their networks from the ground-up and are 
required to meet a baseline of functional services to 
include a web service, a domain name service, active 
directory, e-mail, and bulletin board.  The students must 
then research the security issues facing their systems and 
harden their systems accordingly with patches and other 
methods; the goal being to minimize security risks.  After 
the students have their networks built and functional, they 
must then connect to the game network via a Virtual Private 
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Network, which is logically removed from the Internet.  The 
culmination of all of the preparations is the CDX in which 
the competing schools’ networks and students must endure 
numerous attacks from the NSA red team [1], [5]. 
According to the Certified Ethical Hacking Manual, 
there are five phases by which a hacker progresses the 
attack [6].  The five phases are: reconnaissance, scanning, 
gaining access, maintaining access, and covering their 
tracks.  During a previous CDX, the NSA red team followed 
these phases although the reconnaissance phase was 
shortened, since the red team already had significant 
knowledge of the competing schools’ networks.  The NSA red 
team also did not cover their tracks so that the students 
would be able to recognize when their networks had been 
compromised.  The students gain valuable experience on how 
to detect if they have been scanned, infiltrated, or 
exploited.  Once the students detect that there networks 
have been infiltrated, they must take actions to neutralize 
the problem, take corrective actions to restore the system, 
and finally, conduct research and implement controls so 
that the vulnerability is not exploited again. 
There is a great deal of training and benefit to be 
had from exercises like CDX. However, this type of training 
has a few drawbacks.  First and foremost, this training is 
not conducted on an actual live network and, since the 
students are building their networks to withstand pending 
attacks, the majority of their design decisions are based 
on security, which is unrealistic for an actual functioning 
network that must serve hundreds or even thousands of 
users.  Secondly, this type of training on an exercise 
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network is not a feasible method of training network 
operators across the DoD as it is too time intensive and 
doesn’t entirely transfer to their operational networks.  
Additionally, there is a shortage of red teams to conduct 
the amount of training required for an enterprise such as 
the DoD [7].  The cyber security training value that is 
provided by red teams is highly valuable and is the level 
of training for which the DoD should strive.   
An example of an exercise where red teams conduct 
training on operational networks is the Composite Training 
Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX).  The COMPTUEX is the capstone 
training exercise for a strike group after which the ships 
are assessed for their readiness to deploy and engage in 
battle.  COMPTUEX is a multifaceted exercise that is 
designed to stress the entire strike group, from the staff 
to the individual ship’s officers and crew, as well as the 
air detachment and the Marines (if embarked).   
During COMPTUEX, the operational computer networks 
onboard the strike group ships are attacked by the red team 
from the Navy Cyber Defense Operational Center (NCDOC).  
This training is highly beneficial to the network operators 
since it is on their operational networks.  The training 
that is provided is similar to that of CDX; however, the 
red teams are even further limited on the extent of the 
attacks that they can perform since some of the more 
nefarious attacks could have catastrophic consequences on 
the operational networks and the strike group’s level of 
readiness.  The NCDOC red teams follow a similar theme as 
the CDX red teams by first scanning the ship’s networks, 
followed by infiltration, and finally, exploitation. 
 10 
Throughout the exercise, there are various attacks and 
evolutions that must be completed by the whole strike group 
and there are also events specific to a ship or a subset of 
the group.  Since these exercises need to be graded by the 
training teams, there are times when the red team will not 
strike so that the crew’s performance can be judged against 
the other various conventional attacks. However, some 
cyberattacks during COMPTUEX are scripted to coincide with 
other threats such as an attack on critical communications 
systems that the strike group is facing.  This allows the 
evaluators to answer questions such as, “Can the ship fight 
without its full complement of communications?” [1]. 
The training value is greatly increased by having the 
red teams attack the operational networks, since these are 
the networks with which the administrators and technicians 
are most familiar and feel most comfortable. Upon 
completion of the exercise, the IT personnel have a 
thorough understanding of their network, its 
vulnerabilities, what their sensors can detect, and how to 
recover from an attack.  However, a significant drawback to 
this training is that the red teams are limited and may not 
use their full repertoire of attacks so that they do not 
cause damage to the operational network.  This detracts 
from the realism of the training since an actual attacker 
would not be restricted in the types of exploits that could 
be used. 
Red teams are comprised of “ethical hackers” which 
according to the Certified Ethical Hacking Manual are 
“hired by organizations to attack their information systems 
and networks in order to discover vulnerabilities and 
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verify that security measures are functioning correctly” 
[6].  Ethical hackers are typically contracted to conduct 
security testing which allows them to legally hack a 
network for defensive and security purposes.  Red teams use 
ethical hacking in order to test the network security of 
DoD assets and to provide feedback on the state of their 
security. 
Exercises incorporating a red team provide the most 
realistic training available.  Red teams are utilized in 
the capstone exercises to certify the readiness of all 
deploying forces.  As discussed previously, red teams can 
attack from a variety of angles.  In this thesis, we will 
examine a specific subset of attacks that present the most 
viable threat to information systems today [2]. 
B. MALWARE 
A computer is a tool that executes instructions or 
programs at an extremely fast pace.  In general, when a 
computer executes a benign program, the program safely 
interacts with components of the computer in order to 
accomplish productive tasks.  Malicious software executes 
instructions or programs that are not authorized by the 
user and can be embarrassing, frustrating, or cause damage 
to the system.  According to Nash, malware, short for 
malicious software, is defined as:  
Programming (code, scripts, active content, and 
other software) designed to disrupt or deny 
operation, gather information that leads to loss 
of privacy or exploitation, gain unauthorized 
access to system resources, and other abusive 




adware, dialers, hijackware, slag code (logic 
bombs), spyware, Trojan horses, viruses, web 
bugs, and worms. [8] 
The effects that malware has on a system can range from 
being a nuisance (adware, spyware, spam e-mails) to being 
devastating to the user or business, as in the case of 
virus logic bombs that delete critical files.  A denial of 
service attack can be frustrating for users and can have 
even greater implications for businesses, such as loss of 
revenue. Root kits that allow an attacker unauthorized 
access to a user’s or a business’ data can result in some 
sort of loss or even identity theft, which poses a 
significant security risk.  There are multitudes of types 
of malware and ways that malware can propagate throughout 
the Internet and networks.  Additionally, the methods that 
are employed by hackers are constantly evolving.  For the 
scope of this thesis, the term “malware” will pertain to 
worms, botnets, and viruses. 
1. Worms 
A worm is a self-replicating program that utilizes a 
computer network to send copies of itself to other 
computers and requires no human intervention to do so.  
There are three common characteristics of Internet worms 
according to Gu et al. [9]: 
 Many worms generate a substantial volume of 
identical or similar traffic which provides the 
possibility of detecting them using their 




them using network traffic analyzers such as 
Wireshark or intrusion detection systems such as 
Snort. 
 They use random scanning to probe for vulnerable 
hosts which can also be detected by passive 
listening applications. 
 Vulnerable hosts exhibit infection-like behavior 
when infected. That is, the host is first 
scanned, and then it sends out scans destined for 
the same port on other machines.  This too can be 
detected by passive listening applications.  
Worms typically have some sort of malicious payload or 
application that can be used to entice the user to visit a 
website, send data back to a central computer, create 
backdoors for further data extraction, or delete vital 
system files on the host computer.  The first known 
Internet worm was the Morris worm in 1988, and other 
notable examples of worms are the Nimda worm and Code Red 
worm [1], [9]. 
2. Botnets 
Botnets are networks of “bots,” which are computers 
that have been infected by a worm and are subverted as 
remotely-directed hosts. Botnets are most commonly 
associated with Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks; however, according to Messmer,  
It’s not just DDoS attacks that are associated 
with bots. Botnets are usually specialized, 
designed for criminal tasks that range from spam 
distribution; stealing identity credentials such 
as passwords, bank account data or credit cards 
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and key-logging; click fraud; and warez (stealing 
intellectual property or obtaining pirated 
software). [10] 
The main characteristic that distinguishes a bot from a 
virus or a worm is the command and control structure.  Bots 
are typically designed with a command and control structure 
that allows for the subverted machines to be controlled by 
either a single server or a distributed command server.  
The command and control structures are generally 
coordinated over other protocols; for example, Hyper Text 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or Internet Relay Chat (IRC).  
This command structure lends itself to DDoS attacks since 
all of the bots could be simultaneously commanded to send 
traffic to a target server, which would overwhelm the 
target and could result in a loss of functionality, 
business, and revenue. Bots, like worms, will exhibit 
scanning behaviors as they try to expand the reach of the 
botnet and are, therefore, also detectable with traffic 
analysis tools such as Wireshark or Snort.  Another 
characteristic of bots is that they can lay dormant for 
long periods of time until commanded by the control server 
to perform some function. 
Some examples of botnets include Conficker, which is 
still active and is used to try to sell fake antivirus 
software; Gammima, which was used to steal gaming login 
information; and Zeus, which was used to steal banking 
information [1], [10]. 
3. Viruses 
In his book, The Art of Virus Research and Defense, 
Peter Szor defines a computer virus as: 
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Code that recursively replicates a possibly 
evolved copy of itself.  Viruses infect a host 
file or system area, or they simply modify a 
reference to such objects to take control and 
then multiply again to form new generations. [11] 
There are various ways that viruses are classified.  
One way that viruses are classified is by how they infect 
target hosts, such as boot records, files, and in-memory.  
They can also be classified by what computer architectures 
they target, such as processor types or operating systems; 
file systems and file formats targeted; or interpreted 
environments, such as scripts (PHP, Batch, Jscript, and 
Shell scripts) and macros.  Viruses can also be classified 
by their defensive mechanisms, such as tunneling, 
retroviruses, armored, morphing, and encryption.  Finally, 
viruses can be classified by the payload that they deliver 
to the target hosts, such as benign or harmless, 
destructive, data stealing, or denial of service [1], [10]. 
Viruses are typically combatted with the use of 
signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs); which 
is a reactive approach once the virus has spread and caused 
some sort of damage.  The success of IDSs depends on users 
or network administrators keeping their virus signature 
definitions up to date.  Since viruses are code that 
resides somewhere on the infected host, the IDSs scan 
periodically based on the signature definitions to detect 
viruses.  It is possible for viruses to morph as they 
spread making them more difficult to detect. 
A well-known example of a computer virus is the “I 
Love You” virus.  The I Love You Virus was a Visual Basic 
Script (VBS) LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.VBS that was attached 
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to an e-mail and tricked users into opening the attachment.  
Once the script was executed, it forwarded itself to all of 
the contacts in the victim’s Microsoft Outlook contact list 
as well as overwriting numerous files on the victim’s 
computer with malicious code. The I Love You Virus also 
created a number of registry keys so that it would be 
initialized when the infected machine booted.  This virus 
exploited a Microsoft algorithm for hiding file extensions 
so that the extension appeared to be a benign .”TXT” file.  
The I Love You Virus spread across the world in less than a 
day, and in a week it is estimated that fifty million 
computers had been infected at an estimated cost of 
$5.5 billion [12], [13]. 
C. PROOF OF CONCEPT OF SOFTWARE TRAINING USING MALWARE 
MIMICS 
In the thesis “Malware Mimics for Network Security 
Assessment” by CDR William Taff and LCDR Paul Salevski, the 
authors demonstrated that it was possible to create a 
software-based network training tool for network 
administrators and operators.  They created a system based 
on the client-server relationship that allowed for modeling 
network traffic and behaviors of malware without any actual 
malware being introduced to the network. The authors showed 
that this tool could be used to provide training equivalent 
to that of red teams which could supplement the training 
provided by red teams.   
The system that the authors created had the following 
characteristics: 
 The system was designed to be safe for the 
network.  If there was a loss of communication 
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between the clients and the server it would be 
recognized as a termination of the exercise and 
the network would return to the normal operating 
state. 
 The system only mimicked malware behaviors and no 
actual malware was ever introduced to the 
network.  Using this model, we can mimic a 
multitude of malware for the training benefit of 
the users. 
 The system constructed was distributed so that 
the trainer could be located anywhere on the 
network or even remotely to control the scenario. 
Their thesis was a proof-of-concept for this training tool 
upon which we intend to expand. 
D. HOW WE CURRENTLY TRAIN 
1. Training Objective 
In an effort to scope our discussion of training, we 
define the training objective as “the skill or behavior 
that we wish to reinforce.” In this thesis, we will broaden 
the definition with respect to the complexity of the 
training objective.  We will investigate some specific 
examples of malware/mal-behavior and the resulting trainee 
behaviors we wish to reinforce as a result of interaction 
with our software training tool [1]. 
2. Trainer-Trainee Relationship 
The trainee is the person or group of people that we 
wish to train in accordance with a particular training 
objective. For the purpose of this thesis, the trainees 
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will be network administrators and network operators that 
will gain a better understanding of their network through 
the use of our software based training system.  The trainer 
is the person or entity that is administering the training 
to the trainee in order to evaluate their performance with 
respect to the training objective. Typically, the trainer 
for network administrators in the military is the red team 
that simulates the action of an adversary by utilizing the 
adversary’s Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) in 
order to penetrate and exploit the network upon which we 
are conducting training.  Other examples of the trainer for 
network operators are the network administrators or other 
more experienced operators providing training to the less 
experienced operators [1]. 
3. The Safety Observer 
The safety observer is an important part of military 
training and, indeed, any training where risk is involved.  
The safety observer’s responsibility is to oversee the 
trainer and the trainee to ensure that the training is 
conducted safely.  The focus of the safety observer is not 
limited to any one specific aspect of the training scenario 
but is on how the training impacts the organization as a 
whole.  There are instances when the complexity of the 
training is low enough that it does not warrant a third-
party safety observer; for instance, when a network 
administrator is conducting training with a junior network 
operator on a single workstation.  In this instance, the 
trainer can also fulfill the role of the safety observer. 
However, as the complexity of training scenarios increases 
and, in our case, the amount of critical mission functions 
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that have been migrated to automated information systems 
grows, it becomes increasingly important that training 
scenarios are executed in a manner that does not bring 
unintended consequences upon the network or organization.  
This is when the safety observer is of critical importance.  
An example of a training scenario where safety observers 
play a critical role would be when a network is under 
attack on a ship that is in a close quarters battle 
scenario with other ships.  If the attack on the network 
were to result in a loss of communications or radar 
equipment, the ship could be placed in danger while 
maneuvering in the vicinity of the other ships; which would 
place numerous personnel and assets at risk. The safety 
observer would be compelled to call a Training Time Out 
(TTO) in this case to restore control of systems to 
operators and allow the ships to maneuver to safety prior 
to recommencing training.  During a training time out, the 
exercise is completely ceased and all parties involved in 
the training stop immediately, systems are restored and, in 
the case of maneuver of ships, there would be a predefined 
course for all ships to steer in order to avoid collision 
until the environment is deemed safe to recommence 
training.  In this general example of a training scenario, 
we discussed the importance of the safety observer.  In the 
next section, we will discuss how red teams are currently 
employed to conduct network training and some of the issues 
associated with this method of training. 
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4. Inherent Constraints Imposed by the Use of Red 
Teams 
In the International Test and Evaluation Association 
Journal, David Aland provides pertinent and timely insight 
into the issues that are encountered with the way that we 
currently employ red teams for network training [7].  
The first issue that the DoD is faced with when 
employing red teams to conduct network training is that red 
teams are a limited resource.  With the growing number of 
mission critical functions that are being migrated to 
information systems, the agencies that sponsor red teams 
are experiencing an increasing demand for their services.  
Due to the fact that red teams are faced with budgetary 
constraints as well as a long lead time to develop and 
train skilled operators, an exercise planner simply cannot 
count on a red team being available for a particular 
exercise.  Considering these constraints, red teams cannot 
be expected to expand the scope of the training they 
provide without having to cut back on the number of 
training assessments that they can conduct.   
Another issue encountered with how we currently train 
with red teams is that the “customer” or the unit or 
organization sponsoring the training, typically imposes 
constraints or ground rules for the training so that the 
network training does not interfere with other training 
objectives that the units are facing.  Commanders would be 
reluctant to expand the scope of network IA training 
without reassurance that this training would not interfere 
with other critical functions or training objectives.  The 
complexity involved in training exercises, such as 
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COMPTUEX, and the fact that many events are interdependent 
and rely on information systems that would be subject to 
disruption if the networks were being attacked at the same 
time or if a red team were allowed to use their full 
arsenal of attacks result in artificialities in IA training 
or exercise events.  These issues result in de facto limits 
on the training that red teams can conduct and negatively 
impact the quality of the training that is possible. 
Standardization of results is another issue that is 
encountered when conducting network-training assessments 
with red teams.  According to Aland, 
The traditional modus operandi of most red teams 
is to find and exploit a single vulnerability, 
making comparison of one event to another 
relatively difficult, with only a few common 
characteristics. [7] 
This fact, coupled with the complexity of military 
networks, makes it very difficult to ascertain consistent 
feedback from red teams with respect to various training 
exercises since all of these variables lend themselves to 
unique training assessments of each unit that is observed.   
The uniqueness of each training assessment conducted 
by red teams makes it difficult if not impossible to 
determine trends or common problems that are affecting the 
security of DoD networks as a whole.  There are significant 
advantages to be gained by having a core set of training 
events that are conducted against all DoD networks that are 
assessed by red teams.  The results of assessments could 
achieve a greater level of standardization between assessed 
entities, which would allow for creation of a database that 
could be used to compare results from subsequent 
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assessments and determine trends.  These trends could then 
be analyzed to statistically determine the rate of success 
and failure for particular attacks, as well as to identify 
root causes of DoD network vulnerabilities as a whole. 
These constraints give way to the information system 
solution upon which we are continuing development that will 
allow red teams to expand the scope of their training 
assessments without requiring additional time, personnel or 
other resources. 
E. EXAMPLE TRAINING SCENARIO 
In the planning period leading up to the exercise or 
Pre-exercise (PRE-EX) phase, the agency responsible for 
conducting the training would develop a tailored training 
scenario to achieve the specified training objectives. The 
following describes such an activity. 
For this example, the training objective will be to 
identify and take the appropriate steps to combat a worm 
propagating on each ship’s network.  The trainee’s for this 
exercise will be the network administrators and operators 
of a Carrier Strike Group operating in the Virginia Capes 
as part of their pre-deployment training cycle. The network 
training will be conducted simultaneously with other 
training events that the Strike Group is conducting; such 
as flight operations on the Aircraft Carrier, tactical 
maneuvering of the ships in the Strike Group, and an Anti-
Submarine Warfare exercise. 
Prior to commencement of the exercise (COMEX), the 
ship’s Combat Systems Training Teams (CSTT) would receive 
the PRE-EX directive, which outlines the training 
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objectives as well as amplifying information on the 
scenario, such as behaviors which will be exhibited by the 
networks, Training Time Out procedures, etc. The individual 
ship’s CSTTs will serve as the notional “white cells” and 
act as the safety observers for the exercise.  Each CSTT 
will conduct an exercise brief to establish roles and 
responsibilities and review safety procedures, as well as 
expected actions to be taken by the trainees.  Once all of 
the safety observers are in place, the ship would be placed 
in a Combat Systems Training Team environment and the 
status would be communicated accordingly throughout the 
ship. 
Upon commencement of the exercise (COMEX), the entity 
conducting training on the network (red team), physically 
located at Fort Meade, MD, will issue the command from 
their scenario generation server to the trainee ship’s 
scenario execution servers to execute the appropriate 
modules to exhibit the behaviors and signatures of a worm 
propagating on the network.  Once the local exercise server 
receives this command message it will issue a directive to 
a predetermined number of hosts on the network to begin 
exhibiting a behavior (in this instance, port scans).  Once 
these hosts begin scanning other potentially vulnerable 
hosts, the server will command additional hosts to begin 
conducting port scans in order to simulate the spread of 
the worm on the network.  The only effect that our software 
will have on the network will be an increase in benign 
traffic traversing the network.  The increase in traffic, 
as well as other alerts to the network operators, will flag 
the presence of something out of the ordinary on the 
network and will elicit them to investigate further to 
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determine the cause of the errant behavior.  Upon further 
investigation the network administrators and operators 
should identify the behavior as coming from a worm 
propagating on their network and should take appropriate 
measures to quarantine the affected machines as well as 
stop the propagation.  Finally, the administrators should 
report the infection to the higher echelon in the Chain of 
Command, which would be relayed to the red team and the 
exercise would be halted. 
After the exercise, the results in the database could 
be compared with previous exercise results to determine 
trends such as success/failure rate of identifying the 
malicious behavior, time to identify, quarantine of 
affected hosts. 
F. SUMMARY  
In this chapter, we have discussed how red teams are 
utilized to provide realistic training.  We have also 
discussed some instances of malicious software and the 
effects that they can have on networks and computers.  
Additionally, we have discussed how some of the threats are 
employed by red teams and their ethical hackers in order to 
train network administrators and operators.  We have also 
discussed how a software-based training tool has been 
proven viable. Finally, we have discussed how we currently 
train network administrators and operators and asserted 
some of the constraints that are inherent with the use of 
red teams.  In the following chapter, we will assert how we 
can augment the training provided by red teams by expanding 
the software based training tool. Additionally, we will 
explore the desired behaviors that our system will exhibit. 
 25 
III. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND TEST PLATFORM 
In this chapter, we will discuss the current state of 
MAST.  We will also briefly discuss the benefits of the 
MAST system for enhancing DoD network security.  
Additionally, we will discuss the implementation platform 
hardware and software that we are utilizing for further 
development.  Finally, we will introduce and discuss in 
depth the Host Based Security System (HBSS).  
A. OVERVIEW OF MALICIOUS ACTIVITY SIMULATION TOOL (MAST) 
The MAST system implements a variety of new features 
and improvements over the previous version of software [1].  
The MAST software utilizes the client-server architecture 
and allows simulated adversaries (red teams) and trusted 
agents (blue teams) to leverage their existing skill sets 
and conduct training without an increase in risk while 
operating within the prescribed limits.  This training tool 
provides trainers with a whole new set of tools to test the 
trainees’ reaction to particular malware, by which to 
evaluate them with respect to a given training objective.  
The behaviors that our software mimics also allows for the 
same attacks and behaviors to be conducted on various DoD 
networks in a similar manner to allow for consistent 
assessments and better, more-consistent feedback from 
training assessments. 
1. System Design 
The system is designed so that the behaviors and 
signatures of any particular malware are externally 
observable and elicit appropriate responses from the 
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network operators and administrators. The software consists 
of a remote central server that commands a server local to 
the trainee network to execute a training scenario.  The 
local server then commands the malware mimic clients 
running on the workstations of the trainee network to 
exhibit specific malicious behaviors; for example, 
conducting port scans of other hosts on the network to 
mimic the behavior of a worm propagating on the network.  
The overall system architecture is depicted in Figure 1.  
The software poses no actual risk to the network since it 
only mimics malware behaviors and does not infect any host 
with actual malware.  The result is externally observable 
malicious behavior without actually introducing any 
malicious code on the network. 
 
Figure 1.   The MAST Architecture 
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2. Server Design 
The scenario generation server shown in Figure 1 is 
remotely collocated with the entity conducting the 
training, such as the NSA red team in Fort Meade, Maryland.  
This scenario generation server is the central hub from 
which training can be conducted on various units or 
organizations remotely.  In order to conduct training with 
a particular entity, such as a ship or a strike group, the 
scenario generation server establishes a logical connection 
to the ship’s or multiple ships’ scenario execution servers 
via the Global Information Grid (GIG).  Once connection is 
established and all parties are ready to commence training, 
the red team begins sending commands via the scenario 
generation server to the ship’s scenario execution server.  
Upon receipt of the command to emulate a certain malicious 
behavior, the scenario execution server verifies that the 
required modules to execute the commanded behavior are 
installed.  Once the modules are verified as installed, the 
scenario execution server commands a predetermined number 
of hosts to begin exhibiting the malicious behavior.   
In addition to the ability to conduct training 
remotely, the trainers are able to monitor training and 
receive feedback upon completion of the training scenario.  
The scenario generation server also has the capability to 
pause or halt the training scenario remotely.  The scenario 
execution server is also able to pause or halt training 
locally if the operational conditions warrant such an 
action.  Additionally, the scenario execution servers 
(again, local to each network) has the capability to 
conduct local training assessments throughout the training 
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cycle without the need for a red team to conduct individual 
unit training. This feature is similar to the Navigation 
Seamanship Shiphandling Trainer (NSST) that is currently in 
use on ships throughout the Navy to conduct “in-house” ship 
handling training without the need to get underway, that 
is, to leave the pier.  NSST has allowed junior officers to 
increase their proficiency while saving the Navy 
substantial amounts of money associated with getting ships 
underway.  Similarly, our training tool is designed to 
provide network administrators with the capability of 
conducting training locally, throughout the training cycle, 
without an increased demand for red teams.  The value added 
from this feature will dramatically increase the ability of 
network administrators and operators to identify malicious 
behavior and defend their networks while decreasing the 
training costs associated with utilizing red teams.  An 
additional benefit in MAST to DoD network administrators 
and operators is that they do not have to wait to be 
assessed by a red team in order to get experience in 
identifying and combating malicious software. This 
functionality to allow for local training is also a new 
feature of the MAST system. Finally, the scenario 
generation server and the scenario execution server have 
databases that log the results of a particular training 
scenario for comparison with past/future training 
assessments.  These databases are a new feature which allow 
for better, more consistent feedback on training scenarios 
than what our current training methods are capable of 
producing. 
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3. Host Design 
The hosts on the trainee network have a lightweight 
software package, the malware mimic client, which when 
commanded begins exhibiting the desired malicious behavior.  
The malware mimic clients are logically connected to the 
scenario execution server.  When the network is not in a 
training environment, the malware mimic clients continue to 
run idle, in an effectively dormant state.  However, once 
commanded to exhibit a malicious behavior by the scenario 
execution server, they verify that the necessary modules 
are installed and then commence exhibiting the desired 
behaviors.  The trainee’s interaction with the system is to 
observe the malicious behaviors and react to them 
appropriately. 
4. Safety Features 
Our software includes various safety measures to 
ensure that the scope of network training can be expanded 
without a concomitant increase in risk associated with the 
training. 
Prior to commencing training on an entity from a 
remote location, the scenario execution server on the 
trainee’s network would have to be placed in training mode.  
This feature prevents remote training outside of a 
prescribed training event from occurring without the ship’s 
permission. As depicted in Figure 1, a local software-based 
“kill switch” is also implemented on the execution server 
so that if local conditions warrant that the training be 
ceased immediately (i.e., A Training Time Out), the safety 
observer or network administrator on the trainee ship can 
stop the scenario immediately without the delay of 
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notifying the remote trainer.  When the “kill switch” is 
activated, the scenario execution server immediately 
commands all of the malware mimic clients that are 
currently exhibiting malicious behavior to halt. The 
malware mimic clients immediately rollback to the idle 
state that they were in prior to the training exercise and 
the network, as a result of this rollback action, returns 
to normal operation.  These features are analogous to the 
“two-key” safety systems in place with ballistic missiles 
or other weapons systems.   
For ships operating at sea, there is the possibility 
of interruption of network connectivity between the 
scenario generation server and the scenario execution 
server.  The “kill switch” also solves this problem, since 
the scenario can be allowed to execute on the trainee’s 
ship and can be stopped when training is complete.  In this 
case, the feedback generated from the training scenario is 
stored locally on the ship and transmitted back to the 
entity conducting the training once connectivity is 
restored. 
An additional safety feature of the system deals with 
a loss of connectivity between the scenario execution 
server and the hosts on the network.  When a scenario is in 
progress and the malware mimic clients on the hosts 
exhibiting the malicious behavior lose contact with the 
scenario execution server, they immediately cease the 
behavior that they are exhibiting and rollback to the idle 
state.  This feature prevents the malware mimic clients 
from continuing “headless.” That is, they will not continue 
to exhibit their malicious behavior independent of the 
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scenario execution server. The aforementioned safety 
features are improvements to the original safety features 
of the previous system. 
5. System Overhead 
The malware mimic client software component of MAST is 
expected to be installed on hosts on DoD networks as part 
of a base installation, along with the local scenario 
execution server for each network. 
As new modules are created to mimic the most recent 
threats that our networks are facing, they would be 
“pushed” out to all pertinent network administrators in a 
manner similar to how software patches or Information 
Assurance Vulnerability Alerts (IAVAs) are pushed to the 
commands.  With this system to distribute the latest 
modules in place, it should be possible for the trainee 
command to install and maintain the most recent software 
and modules prior to conducting a training assessment.  
However, if a trainee command’s scenario execution server 
receives a command to execute a module that is not 
installed from the trainer’s scenario generation server, an 
error message would be returned to the trainer. Upon 
receipt of an error message, the trainer will push the 
latest modules to the trainee’s scenario execution server, 
which, in turn will distribute the module software update 
to the hosts that are active on the trainee’s network. In 
practice, however, network administrators would be required 
to ensure that their network has the most recent software 
modules in place in preparation for an upcoming training 
exercise.  This feature is new in the MAST system and is 
designed to reduce the burden on network administrators 
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while ensuring that the system is ready to conduct training 
with the latest malware modules. 
Each command’s scenario execution server will “know” 
the current status of its network (i.e., which hosts are 
online) and will choose the hosts to begin executing the 
particular module from these active hosts.  In the event 
that the scenario execution server local to the trainee’s 
network commands a host to execute a particular module and 
that host does not have the module installed (possibly due 
to the host being reimaged), the scenario execution server 
will push the latest module software to the host or choose 
another host to execute the module.  This feature enables 
the training to continue on the network without delay if an 
individual host is not updated. 
6. Benefits of MAST System  
The benefits of MAST are two-fold; we can leverage the 
red team’s current skill set, particularly in developing 
training or assessment scenarios, while establishing a core 
set of training events that can be repeated that allow for 
more consistent feedback from training scenarios. 
Additionally, the value of this training tool is not only 
during red team assessments, but the individual units are 
able to conduct local, in-house training throughout the 
training cycle to better prepare the network operators and 
administrators to deal with real-world threats. Finally, 
the safety features implemented by the MAST system allow 
for more frequent and thorough training while keeping risk 
well within operational limits. 
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B. IMPLEMENTATION PLATFORM 
In an effort to ensure that our system provides the 
most realistic training possible, we have designed our 
proof-of-concept implementation platform to simulate a mock 
shipboard network.  By using the software that is currently 
in use on Navy ships, we aim to prove that the MAST system 
is a viable training tool for system operators and 
administrators throughout the DoD. 
1. Hardware 
The hardware that we are using to implement the MAST 
system is designed to support virtualization of a mock 
Cruiser (CG-71) shipboard network. We are using three Dell 
PowerEdge R610 servers to run VMware server management 
software and the associated virtual machines.  The hardware 
specifications for the Dell servers are as follows: 
 Server 1: 2TB Hard Drive, 32GB RAM, (2)Intel® 
Xeon® Quad-core 2.4GHz processors 
 Server 2: 1TB hard drive, 16GB RAM, (2)Intel® 
Xeon® Quad-core 2.4GHz processors 
 Server 3: 1TB hard drive, 16GB RAM, (2)Intel® 
Xeon® Quad-core 2.4GHz processors 
The Dell servers are designed to enhance 
virtualization capabilities and provide sufficient physical 
memory to support multiple Virtual Machines (VMs).  All 
three servers are connected using a Dell 2716 Gigabit 
switch making the network fully switched since each segment 
is only connecting each respective server and the switch.  
This configuration allows for full duplex communication 
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between the servers and the switch. Thus, the packets can 
travel from server to switch and from switch to server 
simultaneously thereby minimizing latency on our test 
network.  Each server is connected with two Ethernet cables 
which are “trunked,” meaning that the two 1GB capacity 
Ethernet cables are seen as a single 2GB “pipe” to increase 
speed of file transfers between the servers.  This physical 
configuration enabled us to make the most efficient use of 
our physical resources thereby enabling us to implement an 
accurate model of a shipboard network through 
virtualization as depicted in Figure 2. Additionally, we 
used a Cisco 2811 router that serves as the access point 
for remote hosts to connect to the VMs.  Finally, we are 
using a Dell 1920 Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) to 
ensure that we have time to safely shut down our system in 
the event of a loss of power. 
2. Software 
We used VMware products to virtualize our 
implementation platform to replicate a mock shipboard 
network.  By employing virtualization, we were able to 
simulate an entire network without having to use physical 
hosts, thereby reducing the amount of space and hardware 
necessary as well as eliminating the need for cable runs, 
etc.  According to VMware, a virtual machine is “a tightly 
isolated software container that can run its own operating 
systems and applications as if it were a physical computer” 
[14].  A VM behaves exactly like a physical computer and 
has software based CPU, RAM, hard drive, and network 
interface cards (NIC).  The user perceives the VM as a 
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physical computer when in reality it is just another 
program running on the host computer. 
We used VMware vSphere to implement virtualization on 
our servers; it has two components: VMware ESXI version 5.0 
and vCenter Server.  ESXI is the hypervisor and is 
installed on the “bare metal,” that is, it does not require 
a host operating system to run. The VMs are completely 
encapsulated and the hypervisor handles all calls for host 
resources, such as the processor, and device drivers, by 
each VM.  The hypervisor coordinates and schedules all 
resource requests from all of the VMs to the host upon 
which they are running. The management of the VMs is 
handled by vCenter Server, which allows us to centralize 
the management, configuration, and monitoring of the VMs.  
To access vCenter Server, we used vCenter vSphere Client, 
which allowed us to add VMs to the servers and coordinate 
the actions of all such VMs on the servers as depicted in 
Figure 2.  The VMs that we used were already configured to 
work with the hypervisor.  However, if they were not 
previously configured to work with the hypervisor, we would 
have had to use the VMware converter which takes different 




Figure 2.   Physical Topology of Implementation Platform. 
We organized our servers into a cluster to maximize 
the efficiency of the server hardware.  A cluster is a 
group of hosts that share resources and a management 
interface and it effectively makes the three servers appear 
as one resource to VMware.  An advantage of configuring our 
servers in this manner is that it allowed us to use VMotion 
Dynamic Resource Scheduling (DRS), which allows for 
dynamically balancing the VM load across the three servers 
as well as manual load balancing [15]. However, to use the 
dynamic VM balancing, we would need a Storage Area Network 
(SAN), which is a separate network of block level storage 
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that appears to the servers as locally attached storage.  
Consequently, if a particular host’s resources get bogged 
down with its current VM workload, we have the capability 
to migrate running VMs to another host with lower resource 
utilization to ensure that all VMs have sufficient 
resources, thereby minimizing simulation-induced latency on 
the network. 
Additionally, we obtained a commercial license for 
VMware vCenter that allows us to run an unlimited number of 
VMs on our servers (subject to physical memory and 
processor constraints). This allows us to overcome a 
licensing constraint that the previous Malware Mimic 
project faced, which only allowed for ten VMs to run on 
each server. 
3. COMPOSE CG-71 Virtual Machines 
To support further development of the MAST system and 
to ensure that our software provides realistic training on 
current DoD networks, we used the Common PC Operating 
System Environment (COMPOSE) CG-71 VMs (ISNS AN/USQ-
153(V)9), which are VM representations of the actual 
servers and workstations that make up the unclassified 
enclave on CG-71. These VMs allow us to virtualize the 
exact configuration of a shipboard network with which 
operational network administrators in the fleet currently 
work. 
We obtained nine VMs from SPAWARSYSCEN Pacific 
contractor ManTech, San Diego, CA, to simulate a shipboard 
network on our implementation platform. 
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a. Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS) 
Domain Controllers (1,2) 
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition 
that provides the following services: COMPOSE data server, 
primary/secondary DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol),  primary/secondary DNS (Domain Name System) with 
Active Directory integrated,  Symantec antivirus server, 
and other associated services (file/print services, etc.). 
b. ISNS Exchange Server  
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition, 
Exchange Server Standard Edition, Internet Information 
Server (IIS) for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), 
Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP), Web Services 
(HTTP/HTTPS/FTP). 
c. ISNS System Management Server  
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition, 
SQL Server 2005 Standard Edition, Internet Information 
Server (IIS) for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), 
Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP), Web Services 
(HTTP/HTTPS/FTP).  Also provides SMS distribution point and 
server. 
d. CND-OSE HBSS Server 
Computer Network Defense-Operating System 
Environment: Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard 
Edition, Host Based Security System server that includes 
the ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO). 
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e. CND-OSE MSSQL Server 
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition, 
Microsoft Structured Query Language server and database for 
HBSS and Secure Configuration Compliance Validation 
Initiative (SCCVI). 
f. CG-71 COMPOSE Server 
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 (32 bit), Common PC 
Operating System Environment server. 
g. CG-71 COMPOSE SCCVI  
Microsoft Windows XP Professional (32 bit), 
Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative 
client that works with HBSS to ensure compliance of 
workstations. 
h. CG-71 COMPOSE Workstations  
Microsoft Windows XP Professional (32 bit), 
McAfee Agent running which interacts with and reports to 
HBSS. 
By using VMs of the unclassified enclave, we 
leverage the power of virtualization while creating the 
most realistic implementation platform for further 
development of the MAST system.  The COMPOSE/HBSS servers 
require roughly 10GB RAM and with our current hardware 
configuration (64GB total RAM), we were able to run 25–30 
Workstation VMs (1.5GB RAM each) before performance began 
to degrade due to resource limitations.  These limitations 
will not impede further development of the MAST system; 
however, they will need to be resolved before we can test 
the scalability of the system. 
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C. HBSS 
Host Based Security System (HBSS) is being deployed by 
the DoD to provide security for Windows and Unix servers 
and workstations. A thorough discussion of HBSS is 
necessary since the MAST system has to interact with HBSS 
in order to function properly and provide realistic 
training to DoD network system administrators and 
operators. 
HBSS provides host-based security to the network 
through behavioral, signature, desktop-firewall, and 
application-blocking protections. Behavioral rules are 
established to identify a profile of network activity; 
deviation from these profiles will result in a system 
alert.  Signature-based, malicious-activity protection is 
provided by the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS).  
HIPS agents cross-check host activities against the 
malicious-activity signature database to determine whether 
or not activity is malicious.  If an activity is determined 
to be malicious, an alert is sent to the McAfee ePolicy 
Orchestrator console, which is described below. HBSS 
provides desktop, i.e., individual host platform, firewall 
protection by establishing a filter between the host 
systems and the network or Internet.  All network traffic 
to and from each host is scanned at the packet level and 
compared with the list of firewall rules.  Finally, the 
application-blocking capability prevents users from 
launching certain executable files on the host systems.  




tools to prevent, detect, track, and remedy malicious 
computer activities and incidents across all DoD networks 
[16]. 
HBSS, as it is currently deployed in MAST, is 
virtualized using VMware ESXI to host the components of 
HBSS on a single server.  The software components that are 
virtualized are: Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio 
(provides user database for HBSS), Secure Configuration 
Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI), and HBSS. We have 
essentially virtualized the rest of the CG-71 network for 
our implementation platform. 
1. McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) 
HBSS behavior is governed by policies and the ePolicy 
Orchestrator (ePO) Server is the central policy management 
point for all of the systems that HBSS manages.  The ePO 
delivers security policies and tasks, controls policy 
updates, and processes alarms (events) for all HBSS managed 
hosts.  The management of the various security products 
(HIPS, Rogue System Detection (RSD), etc.) is accomplished 
through the combination of product policies and client 
tasks.  Product policies ensure that a product’s features 
are configured and perform correctly.  Client tasks are the 
scheduled actions that run on the managed systems hosting 
the client side software [16]. 
The MAST system has to be added as an exception to the 
ePO in order to allow it to run and not be blocked by the 
Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS). 
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2. McAfee Agent 
The McAfee Agent is the distributed client-side 
software that securely communicates information and 
enforcement of policies for each host and the ePO.  For 
each managed host on the network, the agent retrieves 
updates, executes scheduled tasks, enforces policies, and 
reports malicious activity events to the ePO server.  The 
Agent-to-Server Communication Interval (ASCI) determines 
how frequently the agent contacts the agent-handler in the 
ePO server for policy updates. The default ASCI is 30 
minutes for small deck ships (Destroyers, Frigates, etc.) 
and 60 minutes for large deck ships (Aircraft Carriers, 
Amphibious ships).  If a policy update is urgent and needs 
to be sent to all clients immediately to address a threat 
to the network, a “wake-up” call can be sent to all agents 
on managed systems to force them to receive the update 
immediately. However, this will slow down the network 
temporarily due to the increase in network traffic to all 
hosts [16]. 
The McAfee Agent also encompasses the following 
product agents: 
 Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) 
 Device Control Module (DCM) Plug-in 
 Asset Baseline Monitor (ABM) Plug-in 
 Policy Auditor (PA) Plug-in 
3. McAfee Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) 
HIPS provides several fundamental security features, 
including application blocking and firewalls that, when 
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combined, reduce risk for managed hosts.  HIPS utilizes 
signatures, behavioral-based rules, and host-based 
firewalls to prevent attacks.  HIPS is comprised of three 
separate features: the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), 
the firewall, and application blocking [16]. Each is 
described below. 
a. Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) 
The IPS feature monitors all system and 
Application Program interface (API) calls and blocks 
program calls that are determined to be malicious in 
nature, based on signatures. The IPS monitors individual 
host’s program calls, as well as network program calls.  
IPS uses a database of signature rules that is installed 
with each McAfee Agent and updated as new attacks are 
discovered.  IPS signatures are categorized by severity of 
the threat (high, medium, low, information) and set the 
actions to be taken by the IPS when a particular signature 
is matched.  The actions taken are configurable by system 
administrators and range from ePO malicious-event 
notification and system logging to completely blocking the 
application.  The default configuration of the IPS will 
automatically block the host on which malicious activity is 
detected from the network for ten minutes, essentially 
denying service to that machine in an attempt to isolate 
the malicious activity.  With a policy exception for the 
MAST system in the ePO, the MAST system will be able to 
generate simulated malicious activity for the system 
administrators to detect and to appropriately respond [16]. 
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b. HIPS Firewall 
The HIPS firewall protects managed hosts from 
intrusions that compromise data, applications, or the host 
operating system.  The firewall protects hosts by analyzing 
network traffic at different layers of the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) networking protocol model, based on 
specific protocol criteria for each layer, to restrict 
processing of potentially malicious network traffic. The 
firewall is a “Stateful” firewall, meaning that it keeps 
track of the state of network connections and traffic 
traversing the network.  Stateful packet filtering is 
accomplished at the Transport Layer (Layer 4 of the OSI 
model) by examining TCP/UDP/ICMP traffic headers and 
comparing the packets against existing firewall rules as 
depicted in Figure 3. If the packet matches a firewall 
“allow” rule, the packet is forwarded and added to the 
state table. The state table dynamically tracks network 
connections previously matched against the static firewall 
rule set for TCP/ICMP, and therefore reflects the current 
state of the TCP/ICMP protocols on the network.  
Additionally, stateful packet inspection is done at Layer 7 
of the OSI network stack model and is the process of 
inspecting actual application data in packets and tracking 
of commands sent to and from applications as depicted in 
Figure 4.  This combination of stateful packet filtering 
and inspection provides a strong representation of the 










Figure 3.   Firewall Stateful Filtering. 
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Figure 4.   Firewall Stateful Inspection. 
The firewall rules are used to determine how to 
handle network traffic. HIPS uses precedence of its 
firewall rules to determine if traffic should be allowed or 
blocked, that is, the traffic is compared to the first rule 
in the firewall rule list and if it matches, the traffic is 
forwarded and an entry made in the state table. If the 
traffic does not match the first rule, it is compared to 
the next rule in the firewall list, so on and so forth. If 
the traffic is not allowed by the last rule in the firewall 
list, the traffic is blocked, that is, discarded without 
further processing [16]. 
 
 47 
c. HIPS Application Blocking 
HIPS Application Blocking provides the capability 
to block application “creation” and application “hooking.”  
Application creation monitors applications that are trying 
to execute. Application rules are similar to firewall rules 
and allow specific applications to launch. Application 
hooking monitors applications that are trying to bind or 
“hook” themselves to other applications.  While application 
hooking is an essential part of modern operating systems, 
it can be used nefariously to run malware.  A legitimate 
example of application hooking is an application that 
intercepts a keyboard or mouse “event” message to modify 
the functionality of the application. Programs or 
applications that are allowed to hook to other applications 
are also checked against the application rule set [16]. The 
MAST system has to be added to the application rule list in 
the ePO to be allowed to run properly. 
4. Device Control Module (DCM) 
The DCM restricts access to peripheral devices such as 
thumb drives and other removable storage to prevent 
unauthorized data extraction. McAfee device control 
prevents unauthorized use of removable media using content 
aware data protection.  The DCM can be used to limit what 
data can be written to removable media, or to block access 
to removable media entirely [16]. 
5. McAfee Asset Baseline Module (ABM) 
The ABM is an extension of the ePO and provides system 
and file activity monitoring.  The ABM provides automated 
support for Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) 
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procedures. INFOCON provides a system framework by which 
commanders “can increase the measurable readiness of their 
networks to match operational priorities” [17]. INFOCON 
levels provide alert readiness-postures similar to Defense 
Readiness Condition (DEFCON) for the Armed Forces. The 
INFOCON levels range from “5,” where there are no apparent 
attacks against DoD information systems, to “1,” where DoD 
information systems are currently under attack and are 
configured for the maximum defensive readiness-posture. 
The ABM also provides system-level monitoring, such as 
changes to Windows registry-keys, services, ports, files, 
and local/user groups.  The ABM provides the capability to 
conduct baseline scans and activity scans.  Baseline scans 
record the state of a system’s monitored activities at a 
particular point in time. Activity scans record any changes 
to the system’s monitored activities since the last 
baseline scan [16].  After the MAST system is installed, it 
will be necessary to conduct a new baseline scan to capture 
the state of the system’s monitored activities with the 
malware mimic clients running. 
6. McAfee Policy Auditor (PA) 
The PA provides the ability to validate the integrity 
of a system by scanning for configuration settings and 
options. The PA automates the processes required to conduct 
internal and external IT policy audits. By ensuring that 
host systems are configured correctly, the PA provides an 
overall check of system health [16]. 
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7. McAfee Virus Scan Enterprise (VSE) 
The VSE offers easily scalable protection, fast 
performance, and mobile design to protect your environment 
from viruses, worms and, Trojan horses. This product is not 
currently in use by COMPOSE; however, once this product is 
implemented, it will be necessary to include a policy 
exception to allow the MAST system to run its simulated 
malicious activity [16]. 
8. McAfee Rogue System Detection (RSD) 
The RSD provides real-time discovery of “rogue” 
systems, that is, systems that have a network interface 
card (NIC) connected to the network and do not have a 
McAfee Agent installed from the network’s ePO. The RSD 
utilizes passive rogue system sensors placed throughout the 
network that listen to network broadcasts and Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic to detect systems 
connected to the network [16]. The RSD sensors detect rogue 
systems when they send a broadcast “ARP” request on a VLAN 
segment, and if the sensor does not have an entry for the 
system that sent the ARP, it will report this system to the 
ePolicy Orchestrator.  The ePO then checks to see if the 
host that sent the ARP request has a McAfee Agent installed 
and, if no agent is installed, the system is labeled as 
rogue.  Similarly, if a host attached to the network sends 
a DHCP request for an IP address from the DHCP server, it 
will be reported to the ePO server and checked to see if it 
has a McAfee Agent installed and labeled accordingly. 
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D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed the design considerations 
associated with the MAST system.  Additionally, we discussed 
the implementation platform hardware and software to create 
a realistic development platform for the MAST system. 
Finally, we discussed the Host Based Security System with 
which our system will interact to provide realistic training 
to DoD network administrators and operators. In the next 
chapter we will perform a verification and validation of the 
MAST system concept and assert how the MAST system can 
simulate many of red team and “ethical hacker” methods to 
reduce the burden currently placed on DoD red teams. We will 
also explore the cost effectiveness of the MAST system 
concept. 
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IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RED TEAMS VS. MAST 
In this chapter, we discuss methodologies that are 
employed by ethical hackers and red teams to conduct a 
security assessment or penetration test of a given network 
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of their 
approaches.  We discuss the five phases which red teams and 
ethical hackers use to advance an attack. We will then 
assert how the MAST system can achieve a high level of 
effectiveness of training and improve upon the training 
that red teams currently provide. Additionally, we will 
conduct a verification and validation analysis of the 
suitability of the Malware Mimic concept as a methodology 
for conducting network administrator network security 
training and awareness and develop a strategy by which the 
effectiveness of the MAST system for increasing such 
network security awareness and elevating the information 
assurance posture of distributed command networks can be 
measured. 
A. RECONNAISSANCE 
As previously discussed in Chapter II, ethical hackers 
and red teams typically utilize a five phased approach to 
advance an attack against a target network: reconnaissance, 
scanning, gaining access, maintaining access, and covering 
their tracks. In this and the following sections we discuss 
some of their methods and how the MAST system will enhance 
their capabilities. 
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1. Red Team Methods 
Red teams conduct reconnaissance on a target network 
by utilizing a technique known as “footprinting.”  
According to the Certified Ethical Hacker Manual, 
“Footprinting refers to uncovering and collecting as much 
information as possible about a target network” [6].  Red 
teams utilize footprinting to gather valuable system level 
information about target networks such as operating systems 
and other software version information as well as 
individual account details, server names, and database 
schema. DoD red teams may not necessarily have to rely on 
the various methods of footprinting to gather information 
about target networks due to the fact that they have a lot 
of this information from their knowledge of systems 
deployed on DoD networks. However, in some cases, red teams 
use some of the following footprinting methods to gather 
further information about the configuration of the target 
network. 
a. Internet Footprinting 
Internet footprinting consists of extracting data 
about a target network using search engines and other 
freely available tools on the Internet. An example of how a 
red team could use information that is easily found on the 
Internet to gain further information about a target network 
would be to visit the Command’s official website to gather 
information about the Command’s leaders, i.e., Commanding 
Officer, Executive Officer, and Command Master Chief, such 
as e-mail address and other information.  This information 
could then be used to mount social engineering phishing 
attacks against crew members.  For example, a red team 
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could spoof e-mails from the leadership of the target 
command to junior personnel in the command to determine the 
effectiveness of the command’s training program by 
attempting to coax personnel to divulge sensitive 
information, such as information about the command’s 
schedule.  Likewise, the red team could spoof the e-mail 
address of the network administrator to see if any 
personnel would divulge information about their accounts, 
such as their password for example, which the red team 
could use to attempt to gain further access to the target 
network. 
Another tool that red teams utilize to discover 
information about a target network is the “whois” query.  
Whois is a utility that is available in various Unix/Linux 
distributions and there are tools that implement similar 
functionality readily available online. Whois queries 
return information about domain owners from Regional 
Internet Registries (RIRs) such as domain name details, 
domain name servers, NetRange (IP address range of the 
target domain), administrative contact information, phone 
numbers, etc.  With this information, red teams can gain 
further information about the target network using DNS 
footprinting. 
b. DNS Footprinting 
DNS footprinting enables a red team to extract 
further information about the target network through 
various DNS interrogation tools. DNS footprinting tools 
query the target network’s DNS records to gather 
information about the topology of the network. Some 
examples of DNS records and the information that they 
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reveal are: the A record which points to target host’s IP 
address, the MX record which points to the target network’s 
mail server, the NS record which points to the host’s name 
server, the CNAME record which reveals canonical names 
(aliases) of hosts, the PTR record which maps IP addresses 
to host names, and the HINFO record which contains host CPU 
type and operating system. Once the red team has this 
information, they can use a tool such as Traceroute to 
further map the topology of the target network.  Traceroute 
utilizes the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) to 
discover the routers on a path to a target host by sending 
packets and incrementing the Time To Live (TTL) field in 
the header of each ICMP packet until the target host is 
reached.  By utilizing Traceroute, red teams are able to 
determine information about the network topology, trusted 
routers, and firewall locations. 
Once red teams have this information about a 
target network (either through previous knowledge or 
footprinting), they can determine the vulnerabilities that 
exist with the systems and software and attempt to exploit 
them to gain access to the target network to search for 
further vulnerabilities. 
One advantage that red teams have is that it is 
relatively easy to gather information about a target 
network using these techniques. A disadvantage that red 
teams face is that it is time consuming for red teams to 
conduct thorough footprints of networks. Another 
disadvantage of relying solely on red teams to conduct 
reconnaissance with footprinting is that there is no 
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standardization of the reporting of findings from the tests 
of different networks throughout the DoD. 
Due to the resource constraints that are a 
reality with DoD red teams, there are multiple benefits to 
be gained by automating the footprinting process. 
2. MAST Methods  
While footprinting is not implemented in the current 
version of the MAST system, it can be developed where the 
techniques utilized by red teams can be automated (Whois 
queries, DNS queries, etc.) to determine how vulnerable a 
particular DoD network is to this sort of information 
gathering and also to test the network’s compliance with 
firewall configuration policies, etc.  The remote scenario 
execution server can perform this type of policy check 
prior to an assessment to determine vulnerabilities on 
various DoD networks and to allow for consistent reporting 
and feedback. Such feedback allows for better monitoring of 
network compliance and readiness DoD-wide, as well as trend 
analysis of common vulnerabilities. The MAST footprinting 
module could also be used on a scheduled or random basis on 
various networks DoD-wide, subject to local command and DoD 
policies, to conduct a “spot check” of compliance of DoD 
networks outside of organized training events. In this 
manner, the MAST footprinting module will ensure the IA 
security readiness posture of DoD networks is within 
prescribed limits at all times, which will ultimately raise 
the DoD network security readiness posture on the whole.  
Additionally, the MAST system can implement a method 
for checking individual command’s training effectiveness 
against social engineering phishing attacks. For instance, 
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a module can be created that sends e-mail to junior sailors 
by using ship’s address book for all E-3 and junior sailors 
and see how many sailors will respond to a request for 
sensitive information, such as their password, and how long 
until the query is reported to the network administrators.  
Metrics to determine the effectiveness of training might 
include “how many sailors divulged sensitive information?” 
and “how long did it take for the phishing attempt to be 
reported to network administrators?” These resultant 
metrics could be locally stored in the command’s scenario 
execution server’s database and also sent back to the 
initiating scenario generation server (via secure 
connection) so that the results can be added to the master 
database.  These results could then be compared to past 
results from that specific command as well as the results 
from all DoD networks to allow for greater trend analysis, 
as well as providing consistent data for individual command 
de-briefings. 
B. SCANNING 
1. Red Team Methods 
Red teams utilize various network scanning techniques 
to gain a greater understanding of the topology of a target 
network and to find potential vulnerabilities to exploit.  
According to the Certified Ethical Hackers Manual, 
“Scanning refers to a set of procedures for identifying 
hosts, ports, and services in a network” [6]. The general 
methodology that red teams employ to scan a target network 
is to scan for live hosts (i.e., hosts that are online), 
check for open ports on those hosts, and then scan those 
hosts for vulnerabilities.  The information that red teams 
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gather from these scans allows them to draw a notional 
network diagram and to focus on vulnerabilities that they 
intend to attempt to exploit. Red teams utilize a tactic 
known as a “ping sweep” to determine what hosts on a target 
network are online.  There are various tools that implement 
this ping sweep functionality for example, Hping is a 
command line utility that automates the crafting of ICMP 
Ping packets to determine which hosts are online in a given 
IP address range.  The ping method in relies on the ICMP 
protocol which can be turned off in IPV4, however, the ping 
functionality cannot be turned off in IPV6.  
Once the red team has determined which hosts are 
online in a target network, they typically conduct a port 
scan using a tool such as Hping or Nmap.  Port scans rely 
on the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), and the “three 
way handshake” that takes place in order to establish a 
connection between a server and a client. The three way 
handshake is executed as follows: a client sends a SYN 
packet to a specific port on another client, if the port is 
“open” (has a service listening), the second client 
responds with a SYN-ACK packet with a sequence number, 
acknowledging the connection request, to which the 
initiating client responds with an ACK packet echoing back 
the sequence number.  Once this process is complete, a 
connection is established between the two clients and they 
can communicate further.  If the port with which a 
connection attempt is initiated is closed, the client with 
the closed port will respond with a RST packet.  To “tear 
down” (close) the connection the initiating client responds 
with a RST packet and the connection is closed.  A port 
scan that executes the full three way handshake is known as 
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a full open scan; however, this type of scan is easily 
detectable by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) so in an 
effort to avoid detection, red teams will typically employ 
a form of “stealth” scanning.   
Stealth scanning allows red teams the ability to 
determine which ports are open on target hosts while 
bypassing firewall rules and logging mechanisms to disguise 
their traffic as usual network traffic. An example of a 
stealth scan is known as a TCP half-open scan.  A half-open 
scan is the same as a full open scan with the exception 
that the client initiating the connection sends a RST 
packet once it receives the initial SYN-ACK packet from the 
target host and, by doing so, the initiating client closes 
the connection initiation before a connection is ever 
established.  The tools that red teams use to conduct these 
scans can be configured to avoid detection by executing 
stealth scans and only scanning well-known ports (port 25 
SMTP, port 80 Web server, etc.).   
An advantage that red teams have with respect to 
scanning target networks is that they have a myriad of 
tools and techniques to conduct scanning. Another advantage 
that red teams have is that these tools are extremely 
effective at gathering data on a target network in short 
amounts of time. 
One disadvantage of using red teams to conduct this 
type of scanning and information gathering for network 
security training is that every training event is 
different.  Depending on the red team personnel conducting 
the scanning and information gathering for a particular 
training exercise, they utilize different tools and methods 
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to gather information from different avenues. This is due 
in part to red team purpose: to identify and exploit 
weaknesses to identify security issues, not to provide 
administrator training. Due to this variability in scanning 
methodologies it is extremely difficult to gather 
consistent feedback from one training event to the next.  
Another disadvantage that red teams face with this type of 
scanning is that the information that they are able to 
gather is limited until they have access beyond the De-
Militarized Zone (DMZ) or beyond the firewall, of the 
network. However, once the red team is able to find a 
vulnerability to exploit that allows them to gain access to 
the target network, they are able to employ these or other 
techniques to gather more information about the target 
network. 
2. MAST Methods  
MAST scanning modules can implement the various 
techniques and functionality of red team’s tools and will 
allow for thorough scanning of networks while not 
increasing the risk to the networks. The MAST system allows 
for the testing of firewall policies, and network 
administrators’ knowledge of Pre-Planned Responses (PPRs) 
while ensuring that the test scans are consistent and 
repeatable on all networks DoD-wide.  Due to the consistent 
and repeatable features implemented by the MAST system 
scanning modules, it will be much easier to replicate 
training and consolidate consistent feedback from the 
results of scans, which allows for trend analysis of DoD 
networks so that we can identify trends and better shape 
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our PPRs to adversary’s scanning techniques, which will 
ultimately result in improved overall IA posture of DoD 
networks. 
An advantage of conducting training with the MAST 
system for network administrators and operators to 
recognize scanning behaviors is that the training is 
repeatable and can be reproduced once the network 
administrators have addressed previously detected 
vulnerabilities. The feedback from the MAST system will 
reflect the improved IA posture of the trainee thus 
providing more timely feedback of the defensive IA posture 
of the network. 
A disadvantage of MAST system is that as new 
vulnerabilities are discovered, they would require new 
modules to be written for the MAST system.  However, once 
the new modules are written, the red teams or other 
training entities will be able to conduct training with the 
new module on all of the various DoD networks, allowing for 
a quick turnaround on training specific to new 
vulnerabilities and their associated PPRs, thus increasing 
the DoD’s IA posture to emerging threats in a more timely 
manner. 
C. GAINING ACCESS 
1. Red Team Methods 
Red teams use various techniques, such as password 
eavesdropping, brute force, or dictionary password-cracking 
attacks, to gain access to a target system which they can 
then use to escalate privileges on that system, run 
exploits, etc.  Additionally, there are a vast number of 
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exploitable vulnerabilities that red teams use to gain 
access to a network. Once the red team has sufficient 
information about the operating systems and software 
deployed on a given target network, they are able to 
determine which vulnerabilities to attempt to exploit to 
gain access to the network.  One method red teams use to 
gain access to a network is to determine the level of 
patching of particular systems on the network and exploit 
known vulnerabilities that have not been patched.  Red 
teams are successful using this approach due to the myriad 
of exploitable software bugs that exist in current 
software.  According to DARPA, for every one thousand lines 
of code in software, there are one to five bugs introduced 
[18] and since modern operating systems and security 
software size is on the order of millions of lines of code, 
and the fact that we are constantly implementing new 
software, the attack surface for red teams (as well as 
adversaries), is extremely large.   
An example of this type of exploitable vulnerability 
is the Microsoft Windows Remote Procedure Call (RPC) 
Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The RPC-DCOM, if 
left unpatched in various Windows operating systems, is 
vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack which allows the 
attacker to run arbitrary malicious code on the target 
system with local system privileges [19].   
Once the red team finds an unpatched vulnerability 
they can execute their own malicious code to manipulate the 
target system and return a command prompt with system 
privileges, for instance. Once the red team has unabated 
access to a system on a network, they are able to utilize 
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their various other methods in order to maintain access to 
the compromised system, gather further information about 
other systems on the network, and a multitude of other 
nefarious activities. 
An advantage that red teams have when attempting to 
gain access to DoD networks is that a vast majority of DoD 
networks have similar software loads, that is they are 
running the same software. Knowing this, a red team is able 
to attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities that they have 
had success exploiting in the past. 
As discussed with Dave Aland, a disadvantage of red 
teams with respect to gaining access to a target network is 
that the feedback that is provided to the trainee network 
administrators typically focuses only on the exploits that 
the red team used successfully [20]. There is value to the 
network administrators in knowing what exploits the red 
team attempted unsuccessfully, and this type of feedback 
also more accurately portrays the overall security posture 
of the network. 
2. MAST Methods  
The MAST system will be preinstalled on DoD networks 
to facilitate frequent and consistent training. As a result 
of this, the MAST system will technically already have 
access to a given trainee network. The advantage that the 
MAST system has over red teams with respect to gaining 
access is that it does not require any malicious scripts or 
files in order to gain access. Additionally, the MAST 
system does not need to engage in other nefarious 
activities such as password cracking in order to simulate 
malicious activity. Due to the fact that the MAST system is 
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a “trusted” system, it can facilitate effective training 
without introducing any malware to the trainee network 
thereby increasing training value without a concomitant 
increase in risk. 
D. MAINTAINING ACCESS 
1. Red Team Methods 
Red teams, and especially adversaries, typically 
utilize a “backdoor” or possibly a remote access Trojan 
Horse to maintain access to a compromised system. A 
backdoor is code that is used to secure remote access to a 
compromised system and effectively bypass normal 
authentication mechanisms (i.e., user name and password). A 
Trojan Horse is “a program in which the malicious or 
harmful code is contained inside apparently harmless 
programming or data in such a way that it can get control 
and cause damage” [6]. An example of a remote access Trojan 
Horse is an executable file, bound to an apparently benign 
file such as a Microsoft Word .doc file, that installs a 
Netcat server on the target machine, which allows the 
attacker to connect remotely to the target machine via a 
command shell by opening an unused port of the attacker’s 
choice and sending commands to the target machine.  The red 
team or attacker has then set up a mechanism for 
maintaining access to the compromised system and is able to 
reconnect at will to send commands to the compromised 
system.  There are a myriad of techniques by which a red 
team can set up unlimited remote access to a compromised 
machine.  Conversely, a red team may just continue to use 
whatever exploit that allowed them access in the first 
place since most training exercises are not longer than two 
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weeks and, as long as they are undetected, the chance of 
system administrators discovering and correcting the 
vulnerability in that time is low. 
An advantage that the red teams have when training and 
assessing a particular network is that they have a 
multitude of exploits and tools to maintain access once 
they have compromised a system. A disadvantage that red 
teams have is that they may be limited on what exploits and 
tools that they can use due to the concomitant risk that 
they induce. 
2. MAST Methods  
As discussed previously, the MAST system is a trusted 
system that only mimics malicious software activity and, 
therefore, the MAST system has the required “access” to 
conduct training.  This implicit access allows for training 
to be conducted on the trainee network without a 
concomitant increase in risk. 
The biggest advantage that the MAST system has with 
respect to maintaining access is that there is no need for 
nefarious techniques to be utilized in order to maintain 
access to the trainee network. As previously mentioned, the 
MAST system allows for training to be conducted without an 
increase in risk to the network. 
E. COVERING TRACKS 
1. Red Team Methods 
As discussed in Chapter II and depending on the 
training objectives of a particular training session, red 
teams may limit their effort on covering their tracks to 
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allow for the trainee to determine what vulnerabilities 
were exploited. However, a common method employed by 
hackers and red teams alike is to utilize a “rootkit” to 
cover their tracks. According to Gray Hat Hacking the 
Ethical Hacker’s Handbook, a rootkit is “software that 
hides itself and other software from system administrators 
in order to perform some nefarious task” [21]. By using a 
rootkit, the red team is able to hide malicious files and 
applications from system administrators.  Additionally, red 
teams may also cover their tracks by deleting log entries 
in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and the attacked 
systems. 
An advantage that red teams have in covering their 
tracks is that they have a myriad of tools and techniques 
to help avoid detection by IDS and system administrators.  
Conversely, however, red teams may be limited in how many 
of their tools and techniques that they may employ so that 
the trainee network administrators are given the 
opportunity to identify the source of attacks on their 
network. 
2. MAST Methods  
The MAST system provides training without having to 
cover tracks since no actual malicious software is 
installed on any system. 
An advantage of the MAST system is the ability to 
conduct IA security training for system administrators, 
DoD-wide, without having to utilize some of the nefarious 
methods that red teams employ to cover their tracks. 
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F. FURTHER MAST COMPARISON WITH CURRENT TRAINING METHODS 
In order to determine how the MAST system as a 
training tool compares with other training methods and to 
verify and validate the MAST system as a training tool, we 
define some metrics from which to base our comparison.  
With these metrics defined, we will then compare the MAST 
system with other network administrator training methods, 
specifically the Rapid Experience Builder (RaD-X), red 
teams, and the Metasploit Framework.  
RaD-X is a training tool for network administrators 
that delivers “hands-on” training with malware [22], [23].  
RaD-X is a deployable training network which allows for 
training to be conducted in an isolated environment. 
The Metasploit Framework is an open source tool for 
penetration testing and network security auditing [6], 
[24].  The Metasploit Framework has roughly three hundred 
exploits for gaining access to various target systems 
(Windows, Unix, etc.).  The exploits allow the user to run 
various payloads of code on the target system and determine 
which vulnerabilities are exploitable on a given system.  
Metasploit can be used to train network administrators on 
recognizing malicious software on their network as well as 
for penetration testing. 
For the metrics defined below, we have assigned scores 
ranging from low to high as a basis for comparison of the 
various training methods and to facilitate further 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
training method. The costs discussed in this section are 
summarized in Table 1. 
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1. Holistic Cost of Training Methods 
The holistic cost of a system is the overall cost, 
including personnel, equipment, travel, etc., associated 
with conducting training for each method. The cost of 
conducting training with the MAST system is medium-low 
since the training is software based and the bulk of the 
cost will be the deployment of the software across the DoD 
with the additional cost of training system administrators 
on the MAST system.  These costs will be outweighed by the 
resultant increase in IA posture throughout the DoD and if 
we prevent just one catastrophic malware attack as a result 
of better trained system administrators, then the MAST 
system proved its worth. 
RaD-X is a self-contained network of twenty to twenty 
five workstations that allows for training in a “sandbox” 
environment; that is, the training network is completely 
isolated.  The cost of deploying RaD-X is medium-high due 
to the fact that the whole system must be shipped to the 
trainee, along with the temporary duty (TDY) costs of the 
system operators, training of operators, etc.  
The cost of conducting training with red teams is high 
due to the cost of training and equipping red teams, as 
well as the costs for research and development for red 
teams to continuously keep pace with currently evolving 
threats.  The cost associated with research and development 
to keep pace with evolving threats applies to all training 
methods but is higher with red teams since the newfound 
methods will have to be trained to for various red team 
personnel.  Additionally, due to the increase in demand for 
red teams as the cyber warfare area garners increasing 
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attention, the costs for red teams to meet the increase 
in demand will continue to rise. 
The cost to conduct training with a tool such as the 
Metasploit Framework is relatively low.  The majority of 
the cost incurred if we used Metasploit as a tool for 
system administrators would be as a result of training 
personnel to use Metasploit effectively. 
 
 Training Method Comparison 
 Training Attributes MAST RaD-X Red Team Metasploit 
1 Holistic Cost Med-Low Med-High High Low 





Coverage of Users High Low High Low 
Coverage of Exploit 
Domain 
Medium High Medium High 
4 Risk Med-Low Low Med-High Med-High 
5 
Realism of Attack 
Vector 
Medium High Med-High High 
Realism of Training 
Environment 
Med-High Med-Low High High 
6 Training Auditing 
(feedback) 









High High Low Med-Low 
9 
Ease of use of 
Training Tool 




Distributed Centralized Centralized Centralized 
Table 1.   Comparison of Training Tools. 
 69 
2. Speed to Product 
“Speed to product” is how long it takes after a new 
piece of malicious software or a new exploit is discovered 
for a particular training tool to incorporate the newfound 
malware/exploit in training scenarios.   
The speed to product of the MAST system is medium-low 
due to the fact that once a new piece of malware or exploit 
is discovered, it has to be analyzed to determine its 
attributes and then a new module written for the MAST 
system to mimic these attributes. 
The speed to product of training on new malware or a 
new exploit with RaD-X is high since the new malware can be 
released to the trainer without the trainer having to 
analyze the malware in detail.  
The speed to product of training on new malware or a 
new exploit with red teams is medium due to the fact that 
red teams must analyze the new malware or exploit and 
determine exactly how it operates to utilize the techniques 
employed by the newfound malware or exploit. 
The speed to product of new malware or exploits with 
the Metasploit Framework is medium since the framework 
developers must analyze the new malware or exploit and then 
implement it for the framework. 
3. Coverage of Users and Exploit Domain 
The “coverage of users” for training conducted with 
the MAST system is high since the training is conducted on 
the actual network of the DoD trainee entity.  An example 
of the high level of user coverage of a MAST training event 
is the “phishing” e-mail module to test the training 
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effectiveness of the trainee’s command by sending a 
phishing message to the entire command and logging how many 
users clicked the nefarious link.  The “coverage of the 
exploit domain” for the MAST system is medium.  This is due 
to the fact that modules will not necessarily be developed 
for every piece of malware since a lot of malware uses 
similar techniques (i.e., scanning behaviors of various 
worms). 
The coverage of users for RaD-X is low since the 
system has to be transported to the trainee command and 
training is typically only conducted on senior network 
administrators and operators; RaD-X is not intended to 
train the average user on malware.  However, the coverage 
of the exploit domain with RaD-X is high since any malware 
can be run on it safely due to the isolated nature of the 
training RaD-X provides. 
The coverage of users with red teams is high since, 
like the MAST system, the training is conducted on the 
actual DoD network.  The coverage of the exploit domain is 
medium with red teams due to the fact that they cannot use 
some of their more nefarious exploits due to the increase 
in risk to the trainee’s networks. 
With Metasploit, the coverage of users is medium due 
to the fact that Metasploit exploits are targeted at 
particular systems and to cover a large number of users or 
systems on a network would require a lot of time and 
repetition of work. The coverage of the exploit domain with 
Metasploit is high since there are over three hundred 
exploits built in to the Metasploit Framework. 
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4. Risk Associated with Training Tool 
The risk associated with conducting training with the 
MAST system is medium-low due to the fact that no actual 
malware is ever used on the trainee network. However, since 
the MAST modules will exhibit the behaviors of malware, 
there is some inherent risk associated with increased 
network traffic causing latency on the network as well as 
the HBSS intrusion detection systems potentially blocking 
legitimate network traffic from a host exhibiting malicious 
behaviors. 
RaD-X provides low risk training because the training 
is conducted in an isolated sandbox network and no malware 
is ever used on an actual DoD network. 
The risk associated with training conducted by red 
teams is medium primarily due to the safeguards and 
limitations placed on red teams to protect the trainee 
network. 
With Metasploit, the risk to the trainee network is 
high because of the nefarious methods which are used to 
exploit vulnerabilities. Safeguards would have to be 
implemented to use Metasploit to conduct network 
administrator training to ensure that risk is limited to 
acceptable levels. 
5. Realism of Attack Vector and Training Environment 
When conducting training with the MAST system, realism 
of the attack vector is medium since the actual malware is 
mimicked and no actual malware is used in the training.  
However, the realism of the training environment with the 
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MAST system is high due to the fact that the training is 
conducted on the actual network of the trainee command.  
With RaD-X, the realism of the attack vector is high 
due to the fact that actual malware is used for training.  
The realism of the training environment is medium-low with 
RaD-X because the training is conducted on an isolated 
training network and not the actual network that the 
administrators oversee on a day-to-day basis. 
When red teams conduct training, the realism of the 
attack vectors is medium-high and is only limited by 
safeguards and constraints put in place to protect the 
trainee network.  The realism of the training environment 
is high with red teams since they are also conducting 
training using actual exploits on the actual network that 
the administrators oversee. 
With Metasploit, the realism of the attack vectors is 
high since the nefarious attack vectors are built into the 
framework.  Additionally, the realism of the training 
environment is high with Metasploit as long as the training 
is conducted on the actual DoD network. 
6. Training Auditing 
The “training auditing” (feedback) of training 
conducted with the MAST system is high since the results of 
each training event are logged in the MAST database.  
Additionally, due to the consistent and repeatable nature 
of training conducted with the MAST system, the feedback is 
consistent across all training events conducted DoD-wide. 
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The training auditing with RaD-X is high, also, since 
feedback is provided to the students after each training 
session. 
With red teams, the training auditing is medium.  This 
is due to a couple of factors. First, red teams typically 
provide feedback only on the exploits that they 
successfully executed, however; there is value to the 
trainee in knowing what exploits the red team attempted 
unsuccessfully.  Second, since different red teams use 
different attack vectors and methods, the feedback from one 
training event to the next is not standardized. 
Conducting training with Metasploit would encounter 
the same feedback issues that red teams face since it would 
be up to the trainer to provide feedback on the exploits 
used and would therefore be subject to different methods 
from training event to training event with the resulting 
inconsistency of feedback. 
7. Training Availability 
The “training availability” or frequency of training 
with the MAST system is high due to the fact that system 
administrators or trusted agents within individual commands 
(CSTT for instance), can conduct training on a monthly or 
more frequent basis. The training objectives could be 
incorporated in a ship’s quarterly training plan and 
addressed accordingly. 
With RaD-X, the training availability is low since 
RaD-X is a limited asset and individual commands may only 
have occasional access to it. 
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As previously discussed, red teams are also a limited 
asset and the demand for their services is ever increasing. 
Due to this fact, the training availability of red teams is 
considered low. 
With Metasploit, the training availability is medium 
due to the fact that it could only be used to train a 
limited number of people since for each trainer it would be 
a one-to-one mapping of trainer-to-trainee for each 
training event.  The other training methods enable a single 
trainer to train many trainees simultaneously. 
8. Consistency of Training 
The “consistency of training” with the MAST system is 
high since the same module (a worm propagating, for 
instance) could be repeated on various networks throughout 
the DoD.  With the MAST system, each training event can be 
tailored to meet desired training objectives and the 
individual modules that are executed to meet these training 
objectives will exhibit the same signatures and behaviors 
every time, which provides consistent feedback and 
training. 
With RaD-X, the consistency of training is also high 
because the training is also repeatable. 
Consistency of training with red teams is low due to 
the variability of exploits used and methods employed by 
various red teams. 
Metasploit offers medium consistency of training since 




code.  Similarly to red teams, training with Metasploit 
would be variable due to the vast number of exploits and 
payloads. 
9. Ease of Use 
The MAST system has a high “ease of use” for training 
because of its modular design of functionality.  The entity 
conducting the training on a particular trainee network 
will pick the modules necessary to fulfill the training 
objectives for the given training event.  Additionally, the 
collection of data from each training event is 
automatically reported which makes the MAST system easier 
to use for trainers. 
Rad-X has a low ease of use as the network must be 
shipped to the trainee location, set up, and tested prior 
to conducting training.   
The ease of use associated with red teams conducting 
training is low due to the fact that the training events 
and feedback associated with them are not standardized. 
The ease of use of Metasploit as a training tool is 
since the Metasploit Framework does not support distributed 
training of many clients simultaneously in the manner that 
the MAST system does. 
10. Training Infrastructure 
The training infrastructure for the MAST system is 
distributed and takes advantage of the client-server 
architecture of networks.  The capability that is provided 
with the remote scenario generation server allows for 
multiple training scenarios to be conducted on multiple 
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trainee units remotely. Additionally, the scenario 
execution servers (local to each network) provide local 
training capability to each command. 
With RaD-X, the training infrastructure is centralized 
as the training network is an isolated sandbox and training 
can only be conducted locally on that network. 
The training infrastructure with red teams is 
centralized since their training is deployed from a central 
location.  Red teams, however, are capable of conducting 
training on multiple units simultaneously. 
The training infrastructure with Metasploit is 
distributed due to the fact that training can be conducted 
independently on various remote networks as well as 
locally. 
As a result of the comparisons made between the 
training tools in this section, we posit that the MAST 
system is indeed a viable solution to the increased 
training demand in the cyber warfare domain.  The MAST 
system will not replace red teams since their skill sets 
are of critical importance to keep up with the constantly 
evolving threats in the cyber domain. However, the MAST 
system addresses the critical need for more frequent and 
consistent training and will augment the training currently 
provided by red teams while easing the burden on that 
limited resource. 
G. STRATEGY TO MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS OF MAST 
To measure the effectiveness of the MAST system, we 
wish to verify and validate the MAST system software, that 
is prove that the system is doing the right job according 
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to specifications (validation), and that the software is 
doing the job correctly (verification). To measure the 
effectiveness of the MAST system as a training tool and to 
verify and validate the software, we propose the following 
testing techniques. 
1. Network Traffic Analysis 
One strategy to measure the effectiveness of the MAST 
system as a training tool is to compare network traffic 
generated from individual MAST modules and compare the 
traffic to known traffic signatures of the mimicked 
malware.  The modules of the MAST system mimic well known 
malicious behaviors of particular attacks (for instance, a 
worm propagating). Since we are mimicking well-known 
malware activity it will be fairly straight-forward to 
determine whether or not our module is accurately 
portraying the behavior of a particular piece of malware.  
A strategy for measuring the traffic might be to utilize a 
packet-capturing program such as Wireshark or TCP-Dump to 
capture traffic passing through a switch on the network so 
that we are capturing all traffic on the network segment.  
Once we are capturing traffic on the network, we would run 
the particular MAST module that we intend to test and upon 
completion of the execution of the module, analyze the 
traffic, comparing it with the known signatures to 
determine how accurately we mimicked the actual malware.  
We would then be able to determine if modifications to a 
particular module are necessary based on the results of 
this comparison and adjust the behavior of our module 
accordingly. 
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2. Intrusion Detection Systems 
Another strategy to measure the effectiveness of the 
MAST system modules is to run the modules on our virtual 
CG-71 implementation platform with HBSS.  Upon completion 
of the execution of a given module, we would inspect the 
logs of the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) and the 
firewall to ensure that the expected log entries are 
generated as a result of our simulated malware.  
Additionally, we would monitor the alarms and log entries 
that are generated by the ePolicy Orchestrator in HBSS to 
ensure that our module is “tripping” the appropriate 
alarms. 
3. Live Testing 
Once we are confident that the MAST system accurately 
mimics the malware we have implemented in the modules, we 
can test the MAST system’s scalability on an IA “range.”  
The Defense Department Information Assurance Range is a 
sandbox environment that simulates the Global Information 
Grid and is operated by DISA and the United States Marine 
Corp [25].  The IA range would enable us to test the MAST 
system on a large-scale implementation and to further 
verify and validate the MAST system as a viable training 
tool. 
H. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed the techniques that red 
teams and ethical hackers use to advance an attack on a 
trainee network.  We also discussed how the MAST system 
accomplishes these same tasks and discussed advantages and 
disadvantages of the red teams methods as well as the 
 79 
corresponding MAST methods.  Additionally, we then defined 
some metrics by which to compare the MAST system with other 
training tools and discussed the strengths and weaknesses 
of each tool.  From this comparison, we assert that the 
MAST system is indeed a viable solution to some of the 
constraints that the DoD is faced with while relying 
heavily on red teams to conduct cyber security training.  
Finally, we proposed some methods for measuring the 
effectiveness of the MAST system as a viable training tool.  
In the next chapter we discuss conclusions from this thesis 
and outline a way ahead on the project with future work. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we performed a verification and 
validation analysis of the suitability of the MALWARE Mimic 
concept of the MAST system as a methodology for conducting 
network administrator network security training and 
awareness, alleviation of red team availability 
constraints, and network user security awareness training.  
We also proposed a strategy by which the effectiveness of 
the MAST system for increasing such network security 
awareness and elevating the information assurance posture 
of distributed command networks can be measured. 
In Chapter III, we discussed the MAST system 
architecture and features that it implements.  Most 
notably, we discussed the safety features implemented in 
the MAST system that enable us to conduct software based 
network IA security training.  These safety features ensure 
that the MAST system will enable the DoD to conduct 
training without a concomitant increase in risk to network 
resources. Additionally, we discussed the implementation 
platform that we have constructed to simulate the hardware 
and software of a shipboard network.  The implementation 
platform enables us to thoroughly test the MAST system with 
the Host Based Security System currently deployed on DoD 
networks to ensure that the MAST system provides the most 
realistic training possible. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the MAST system is not 
intended to replace red teams, since their skills will 
always be necessary in order to discover new 
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vulnerabilities and create safeguards to them, as well as 
thoroughly test a network’s IA posture.  The MAST system 
will augment the assessment capability provided by red 
teams and allow for better IA awareness and an increase in 
overall IA posture DoD-wide. 
Additionally, in Chapter IV, we defined various 
metrics to compare the MAST system with other network 
administrator training methods specifically, RaD-X, and 
Metasploit, as well as red teams. We discussed the 
advantages and disadvantages of each training method and 
assigned each method a score accordingly.  As a result of 
this analysis, we assert that the MAST system is indeed a 
viable solution to decrease the DoD’s dependence on red 
teams to conduct network IA training.  The MAST system also 
enables the DoD to gather more consistent feedback from 
individual training events that, in turn, facilitates trend 
analysis of vulnerabilities in DoD networks. It is 
reasonable to conclude that the increased frequency and 
consistency of training events facilitated with the MAST 
system will pay huge dividends in DoD network security. 
We demonstrated that the MAST system is a viable 
training method and that it will ensure that more frequent 
and consistent training is conducted with DoD network 
administrators thereby increasing the overall IA security 
posture on the whole. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. More Advanced Modules 
The training value of the current iteration of the 
MAST system has significantly improved over the previous 
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version of the MALWARE Mimic software.  However, to fully 
realize the MAST system’s training potential, more advanced 
modules will need to be created.   
As discussed in Chapter II, we foresee a module that 
more thoroughly implements the behaviors of a worm 
propagating on the network.  The worm propagation module 
could exhibit more distinct signatures in addition to 
“scanning” for vulnerable hosts, such as simulating 
replicating itself on further “infected” hosts that will 
trigger responses from the HBSS Host Intrusion Prevention 
System and elicit appropriate responses from trainees.  
Furthermore, the MAST system modules could implement 
various iterations of the worm module to exhibit the 
different signatures from various worms to provide training 
on the various methods which worms use to propagate and the 
behaviors and signatures that they exhibit. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter II, we foresee a 
module that more robustly implements virus behaviors.  The 
virus module could be “sent” to unsuspecting users as an e-
mail attachment and will “spread” depending on how many 
users click the nefarious link. Consistent with the 
methodology and purpose of the MAST, such modules will not 
actually infect the hosts, but rather trigger indicators 
through prepositioned agents to mimic the infection.  
Similarly, as previously discussed, various virus modules 
could be implemented to exhibit the behaviors and 
signatures of different viruses to broaden the training to 
cover more of the exploit domain.  
The footprinting module that was discussed in detail 
in Chapter IV also requires implementation. This module 
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will gather information on the IA state of the trainee 
network and report potential vulnerabilities. The 
footprinting module could also potentially interact with 
other modules to shape how they propagate or possibly give 
feedback to the trainer on what modules to use to provide 
the most realistic training based on the IA posture of the 
network. 
2. Standardized Feedback Criteria 
To maximize the training value of the MAST system and 
leverage the consistency and repeatability of training 
conducted, a thorough analysis of the feedback that 
commanders, trainers, and trainees require should be 
undertaken. An exhaustive list of feedback requirements 
should be compiled for each type of malicious software 
mimicked and then those requirements can be implemented in 
the database and Mast software to ensure that the required 
feedback is provided by each MAST module. This ensures that 
the thorough and consistent feedback that is desired of the 
MAST system will be implemented and thereby greatly impact 
the quality of feedback from IA training events through 
standardization. 
3. Security Implications of MAST 
The MAST software is still in the implementation phase 
as it goes through cyclic development.  With each iteration 
of the software, it is prudent to conduct a security 
assessment of the software and ensure that the MAST system 
does not introduce new vulnerabilities to DoD networks.  As 
discussed in Chapter III, it is crucial that the 
communications between the remote scenario generation 
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server and each trainee command’s local scenario execution 
servers for module injection and training feedback data are 
encrypted and secure. The securing of the communication 
channels of the MAST system will prevent adversaries from 
gaining access to the system and attempting to exploit it.  
Additionally, the MAST software should be thoroughly 
examined to determine if bugs exist and discovered bugs 
fixed to ensure the continued security of the software. 
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